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Abstract—There are many benefits of publication social net-
works statistics for societal or commercial purposes, such as polit-
ical advocacy and product recommendation. It is very challenging
to protect the privacy of individuals in social networks while
ensuring a high accuracy of the statistics. Moreover, most of the
existing work on differentially private social network publication
ignores the facts that different users may have different privacy
preferences and there also exists a considerable amount of users
whose identities are public. In this paper, we aim to release
the number of public users that a private user connects to
within n hops (denoted as n-range Connection Fingerprints,or n-
range CFPs for short) regarding user-level personalized privacy
preferences. To this end, we proposed two schemes, DEBA and
DUBA-LF, for privacy-preserving publication of the CFPs on
the base of personalized differential privacy(PDP), and conduct a
theoretical analysis of the privacy guarantees provided within the
proposed schemes. The implementation showed that the proposed
schemes are superior in publication errors on real datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, more and more people join multiple social
networks on the Web, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Sina
Weibo, to share their own information and at the same time to
monitor or participate in different activities. Many institutions
and firms are investing time and resources into analyzing
social networks to address a diverse set of societally or
commercially important issues including disease transmission,
product recommendation, and political advocacy, among many
others. Although the sophistication of information technology
has allowed the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
social network data, privacy concerns have posed significant
restriction of the ability of social scientists and others to study
these networks. To respect the privacy of individual partici-
pants in the networks, network data cannot be released for
public access and scientific studies without proper sanitization.
A common practice is to release a “naively anonymized”
isomorphic network after removing the real identities of ver-
tices. It is now well-known that this can leave participants
open to a range of attacks [1], [2]. Thus, a great many of
anonymization techniques have been proposed [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6] to ensure network data privacy. However, those anonymiza-
tion techniques have been shown to be susceptible to several
newly discovered privacy attacks and lack of rigorous privacy
and utility guarantees. In response, differential privacy [7] has
been applied to solve such vulnerability in social network
data publication. Differential privacy is a popular statistical
model, and it prevents any adversary from inferring individual
information from the output of a computation by perturbing
the data prior to the release. A limitation of the model is
that the same level of privacy protection is afforded for all
individuals. However, it is common that different users may
have different privacy preferences[8], [9], [10]. Therefore,
providing the same level privacy protection to all the users
may not be fair and in addition may cause the published social
network data useless. Moreover, in reality, not all the identities
of social network users are sensitive[6]. For instance, Sina
Weibo, a popular Chinese microblogging social network, hosts
around lots of media accounts (e.g., NBA and Xinhuanet), and
millions of celebrity accounts (e.g., Christine Lagarde and Kai-
Fu Lee). All these users identities are public, and they in total
account for over 1% of the overall half billion registered user
accounts [11].
In this paper, we classify the users whose identities are
not sensitive as public users to be distinguished from private
users. It is pointed out that releasing the identities of public
users with social network data can benefit both research and
the users themselves [6]. Moreover, we take different privacy
requirements into account to guarantee precisely the required
level of privacy to different users.
In this work, we focus on a specific publication goal when
public users are labeled, i.e., the number of public users
that a private user connects to within n hops. For ease of
presentation, we also use the definition n-Range connection
fingerprints (CFPs)[6] to denote the public users that a private
user connects to within n hops. We choose to focus on the
number of CFPs because it is one of the most important
properties for a public users labeled graph. For example, these
statistics can be used for studying the social influence of
government organizations, simulating information propagation
through media, helping corporate make smart targeted adver-
tising plans, and so on.
In this work, we consider the setting in which a trusted
data analyst desires to publish the number of n-Range CFPs
of each private user. Every private user potentially requires
different privacy guarantee for his or her statistics and the
analyst would like to publish useful aggregate information
about the network. To this end, we employ a new privacy
framework, Personalized Differential Privacy (PDP)[9], [10],
to provide personal privacy guarantee specified at the user-
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level, rather than by a single, global privacy parameter. The
privacy guarantees of PDP have the same strength and attack
resistance as differential privacy, but are personalized to the
preferences of all users in the input domain.
In this work, we propose two schemes to release the number
of CFPs in the context of personalized privacy preferences.
We address the challenge of improving the data utility by
employing the distance-based approximation mechanism and
decreasing the introduced noise. The main contributions of this
paper are:
1) To the best our knowledge, we formalized the question
of releasing the number of CFPs in the context of
personalized privacy preferences for the first time.
2) We present two schemes, DEBA and DUBA-LF, for
privacy-preserving publication of the CFPs regarding per-
sonalized privacy preferences, and we conduct a theoreti-
cal analysis of the privacy guarantees provided within the
proposed schemes. The proposed schemes are designed
to be P-PDP.
3) We experimentally evaluate the two proposed schemes
on real datasets and it is demonstrated that our proposed
schemes have high utility for each dataset.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
preliminaries and related work. Section III presents the prob-
lem statement and privacy goal. Overview of our solutions
is described in Section IV. Section V presents our methods
for privacy-preserving CFPs publishing. The privacy analysis
is reported in Section VI. Section VII describes some of our
experimental results and performance analysis. Section VIII
presents the conclusions of this research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some notations and initial
definitions, and review the definition of differential privacy,
two conventional mechanisms to achieve differential privacy,
upon which our work is based. Then the related work is
discussed.
We model a social network as an undirected and unweighted
graph G = (V,E) ∈ G, where V is a set of vertices
representing user entities in the social network, and E is a
set of edges representing social connections between users
(e.g., friendships, contacts, and collaborations). The notation
e(vi, vj) ∈ E represents an edge between two vertices vi
and vj . We let |V | = n0 and the notation |V | is used to
represent the cardinality of V . For ease of presentation, we use
“grap” and “social network” interchangeably in the following
discussion, as well as “user” and “node”.
A. Differential Privacy
We call two graphs G, G′ as neighboring if G′ can be
obtained from G by removing or adding a one edge, i.e., their
minimum edit distance [12] d(G,G′) ≤ 1. We write G e−→ G′
to denote that G and G′ are neighbors and that G = G′∧ e or
G′ = G ∧ e, where e is an egde. Differential privacy requires
that, prior to f(G)’s release, it should be modified using a
randomized algorithm A, such that the output of A does not
reveal much information about any edge in G. The definition
of differential privacy is shown as follows:
Definition 1: (-differential privacy)[7]. A randomized al-
gorithm A is -differentially private if for any two graphs
G and G′ that are neighboring, and for all O ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(G) ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr[A(G′) ∈ O].
A differentially private algorithm A provides privacy be-
cause, given any two graphs which differ on a single edge
only, respective results of a same query on the graphs are
not distinguishable. Therefore, an adversary cannot infer the
value of any single edge in the dataset. Here,  represents the
level of privacy. A smaller value of  means better privacy,
but it also implies lower accuracy of the query result. The
composition of differentially private algorithms also provides
differential privacy, but it produces different results depending
on the data to which the queries are applied.
• Sequential composition [[13], Theorem 3]. Let Ai each
provides i-differential privacy. The sequence of Ai(X)
provides (
∑
i i)-differential privacy.
While there are many approaches to achieving differential
privacy, the best known and most-widely used two for this
purpose are the Laplace mechanism [14] and the exponential
mechanism [15]. For real valued functions, i.e., f : G → Rd,
the most common way to satisfy differential privacy is to inject
carefully chosen random noise into the output. The magnitude
of the noise is adjusted according to the global sensitivity of
the function, or the maximum extent to which any one tuple
in the input can affect the output. Formally,
Definition 2: (Global Sensitivity [14]): The global sensitivity
of the function f : G → Rd is ∆(f) = maxd(G,G′)≤1 ‖f(G)−
f(G′)‖ for all neighboring G,G′ ∈ G, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the
L1 norm.
Similarly, the local sensitivity and local sensitivity at dis-
tance t of function f are defined as follows.
Definition 3: (Local Sensitivity [16]): The local sensi-
tivity of the function f : G → Rd is LS(G, f) =
maxG′|d(G,G′)≤1 ‖f(G) − f(G′)‖ , where ‖ · ‖ denotes the
L1 norm.
Definition 4: (Local Sensitivity at distance t [16]): The local
sensitivity of f at distance t is the largest local sensitivity
attained on graphs at distance at most t from G. Formally, the
global sensitivity of the function f : G → Rd at distance t is
LS(G, f, t) = maxG′|d(G,G′)≤t ‖f(G)− f(G′)‖ , where ‖ · ‖
denotes the L1 norm.
Note that global sensitivity can be understood as the
maximum of local sensitivity over the input domain, i.e.,
∆(f) = maxG LS(G, f) and local sensitivity of f is a special
case of LS(G, f, t) for distance t = 1.
To maintain differential privacy, the Laplace mechanism
adds noise drawn from the Laplace distribution into the data to
be published. The influence of any single edge on the outcome
will be masked and hidden by the Laplace noise. Let Lap(λ)
be a random value sampled from a Laplace distribution with
mean zero and scale λ. The Laplace Mechanism through which
-differential privacy is achieved is outlined in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: [13]Let f : G → Rd. A mechanism M that
adds independently generated noise from a zero-mean Laplace
distribution with scale λ = ∆(f)/ to each of the d output val-
ues f(G), i.e., which produces O = f(G) + 〈Lap(∆(f)/)〉d
satisfies -differential privacy.
The exponential mechanism [15] is useful for sampling one
of several options in a differentially-private way. A score to
each of the options, which is determined by the input of the
algorithm, is assigned by a quality function q. Clearly, higher
scores signify more desirable outcomes and the scores are then
used to formulate a probability distribution over the outcomes
in a way that ensures differential privacy.
Definition 5: (Exponential Mechanism [14]).Let q :
(G × O) → R be a quality function that assigns
a score to each outcome O ∈ O. Let ∆1(q) =
maxd(G,G′)≤1 ‖q(G,O)− q(G′, O)‖ and M be a mechanism
for choosing an outcome O ∈ O. Then the mechanism M ,
defined by
M(G, q) = {return O with probability ∝ exp( q(G,O)2∆1(q) )}
maintains -differential privacy.
B. Related Work
With the increasing popularity of social network analysis
research, privacy protection of social network data is a broad
topic with a significant amount of prior work. In this section,
we review the most closely related work about privacy pro-
tection on social network data.
An important thread of research aims to preserve social
network data privacy by obfuscating the edges (vertices), i.e.,
by adding /deleting edges (vertices).[6], [17], [18], [19]. Mittal
et al. proposed a perturbation method in [17] by deleting all
edges in the original graph and replacing each edge with a
fake edge that is sampled based on the structural properties of
the graph. Liu et al. [18] design a system, called LinkMirage
, which mediates privacy-preserving access to users social
relationships in both static and dynamic social graphs. Hay
et al. [19] perturb the graph by applying a sequence of r edge
deletions and r edge insertions. The deleted edges are uni-
formly selected from the existing edges in the original graph
while the added edges are uniformly selected from the non-
existing edges. Wang et al. propose two different perturbation
methods to anonymize social networks against CFP attacks in
[6], which serves as the practical foundation for our algorithm.
Their first method is based on adding dummy vertices, while
the second algorithm achieves k-anonymity based on edge
modification. Their proposed methods can resist CFP attacks
on private users based on their connection information with
the public users. Another important work for our algorithm
is [8]. Yuan et al. [8] introduce a framework that provides
personalized privacy protection for labeled social networks.
They define three levels of privacy protection requirements by
modeling gradually increasing adversarial background knowl-
edge. The framework combines label generalization and other
structure protection techniques (e.g., adding nodes or edges)
in order to achieve improved utility.
Most of the obfuscating based works mainly focus on
developing anonymization techniques for specific types of
privacy attacks. They employ privacy models derived from
k-anonymity [20] by assuming different types of adversarial
knowledge. Unfortunately, all these anonymization techniques
are vulnerable to attackers with stronger background knowl-
edge than assumed, which has stimulated the use of differential
privacy for more rigorous privacy guarantees.
There are many papers [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26]
have started to apply differential privacy to protect edge/node
privacy, defined as the privacy of users relationship or identity
in graph data. One important application direction aims to
release certain differentially private data mining results, such
as degree distributions, subgraph counts and frequent graph
patterns [22], [24], [26]. However, our problem is substantially
more challenging than publishing certain network statistics or
data mining results. Our goal is to publish the CFPs of private
user, which incurs a much larger global sensitivity. Note that
the sensitivity in the problem setting of [24] is only 1. Whats
more, each private user in the networks independently specifies
the privacy requirement for their data. In addition, some latest
works are done for graph-oriented scenario. Proserpio et al.
[25] develop a private data analysis platform wPINQ over
weighted datasets, which can be used to answer subgraph-
counting queries. Zhang et al. [26] propose a ladder framework
to privately count the number of occurrences of subgraphs.
There are also some other related works aiming to publish a
sanitized graph, which is out the scope of the objective of this
paper. In [27], Sala et al. introduced Pygmalion, a differentially
private graph model. Similar to [27], Wang and Wu employed
the dK-graph generation model for enforcing edge differential
privacy in graph anonymization [28]. In [29], Xiao et al.
proposed a Hierarchical Random Graph (HRG) model based
scheme to meet edge differential privacy. In addition, Chen
et al. [30] propose a data-dependent solution by identifying
and reconstructing the dense regions of a graph’s adjacency
matrix.
III. PRIVACY GOAL
A. Problem Definition
In general, we assume there are some public users whose
identities are not sensitive in social networks. Except the
public users, the rest of the users are private users, whose edges
are sensitive and each private user independently specifies the
privacy requirement for their data. For convenience, we denote
the set of public users in the social network as Vpub and the set
of private users Vpri and we let |Vpub| = mp and |Vpri| = m.
More formally, the Privacy Specification of private users is
defined as follows:
Definition 6: (User-Level Privacy Specification[10]). A pri-
vacy specification is a mapping P : Vpri → R+ from private
users to personal privacy preferences, where a smaller value
represents a stronger privacy preference. The notation P v is
used to denote the privacy preference corresponding to user
v ∈ Vpri.
Similar to [10], we also describe a specific instance of a
privacy specification as a set of ordered pairs, e.g., P :=
{(v1, 1), (v2, 2), . . .} where vi ∈ Vpri and i ∈ R+. We
also assume that a privacy specification contains a privacy
preference for every v ∈ Vpri , or that a default privacy level
is used. Here the information about any edge in G should be
protected, and the privacy specification of edge e(vi, vj) can
be quantified by min{P vi , P vj}.
In this paper, we focus on privately releasing of connection
statistics between private users and public users. First, we
specify the hop distance h(vi, vj) between two vertices vi
and vj as the number of edges on the shortest path between
them. Second, as indicated in ref.[6], we call the public user
v as vi’s connection fingerprint (CFP) if the private user vi
and the public user v is linked by a path of certain length.
For a given hop distance n, the formal definitions of the nth-
hop connection fingerprint CFPn(vi) and n-range connection
fingerprint CFP (vi, n) for a private user vi in Definition 7
and Definition 8, respectively.
Definition 7: (nth-Hop Connection Fingerprint[6]): The nth-
hop connection fingerprint CFPn(vi) of a private vertex vi
in a social network G = (V,E) consists of the group of
public vertices whose hop distances to vi are exactly n, i.e.,
CFPn(vi) = {ID(vj)|vj ∈ Vpub ∧ h(vi, vj) = n}.
Definition 8: (n-Range Connection Fingerprint[6]): The
n-range connection fingerprint of a private vertex vi, de-
noted by CFP (vi, n), is formed by vi’s xth-hop connec-
tion fingerprints, where 1 ≤ x ≤ n, i.e., CFP (vi, n) =
∪x∈[1,n]CFPx(vi).
Given a system parameter c, we aim to release the number
of kth-hop(1 ≤ k ≤ c) connection fingerprints for each private
user in the sensitive graph, while protecting individual privacy
in the meantime. Formally, we write fk(G) : G → Rm
to denote the function that computes the number of kth-
hop connection fingerprints for each private user in graph
G. Therefore, the final publication results for a sensitive
graph G can be denoted in a form of m × c matrix F =
(f1(G), , fc(G)).
B. Privacy Goal
The goal of this paper is to release the connection statistics
under the novel notation of Personalized Differential Privacy
(PDP) [9], [10]. In contrast to traditional differential privacy,
in which the privacy guarantee is controlled by a single, global
privacy parameter (i.e., ), PDP makes use of a privacy speci-
fication, in which each user in Vpri independently specifies
the privacy requirement for their data. More formally, the
definition of PDP is showed in Definition 9.
Definition 9: (Personalized Differential Privacy (PDP)[9],
[10]). In the context of a privacy specification P and a universe
of private users U , a randomized mechanism M : G → Rm
satisfies P-personalized differential privacy (or P-PDP), if for
every pair of neighboring graphs G and G′, with G
eij−−→ G′
and eij = e(vi, vj), and for all O ∈ Range(M), Pr[M(G) ∈
O] ≤ emin{Pvi ,Pvj } · Pr[M(G′) ∈ O].
Intuitively, PDP offers the same strong, semantic notion of
privacy that traditional differential privacy provides, but the
privacy guarantee for PDP is personalized to the needs of
every user simultaneously. Jorgensen et al.[10] point out that
the composition properties of traditional differential privacy
extend naturally to PDP, see Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: (Composition[10]). Let M1 : G → Rm and
M2 : G → Rm denote two mechanisms that satisfy PDP
for P1 and P2 , respectively. Then, the mechanism M3 :=
(M1(G),M2(G)) satisfies P3-PDP, where P3 = P1 + P2.
A smart general purpose mechanism for achieving PDP,
called Sample Mechanism, is proposed in [10]. The sample
mechanism works by introducing two independent sources
of randomness into a computation: (1) non-uniform random
sampling at the tuple level, and (2) additional uniform random-
ness introduced by invoking a traditional differentially private
mechanism on the sampled input.
Theorem 3: (The Sample Mechanism[10]). Consider a
function f : G → Rm, a social network G ∈ G, a configurable
threshold t and a privacy specification P . Let RS(G,P, t)
denote the procedure that independently samples each edge
eij = e(vi, vj) ∈ G with probability
pi(eij , t) =
{
emin{P
vi ,P
vj }−1
et−1 if min{P vi , P vj} < t,
1 otherwise.
where minv P v ≤ t ≤ maxv P v . The sample mechanism
is defined as Sf (G,P, t) = DP tf (RS(G,P, t)) where DP tf
is any t-differentially private mechanism that computes the
function f . Then the sample mechanism Sf (G,P, t) achieves
P-PDP.
The mechanism DP tf could be a simple instantiation of
the Laplace or exponential mechanisms, or a more complex
composition of several differentially private mechanisms.
IV. OVERVIEW OF OUR SOLUTIONS
Given our problem of releasing the number of kth-hop(1 ≤
k ≤ c) connection fingerprints under P-PDP, we overview the
baseline and our advanced methods to give a brief glance on
our motivations.
Baseline method. A baseline method is to apply a(n)
uniform or exponential budget allocation method and release
a P/c (or P/2k and the budget is P/2c−1 indeed for k = c)-
personalized differential private result for every k(1 ≤ k ≤ c).
If each released statistics for kth-hop(1 ≤ k ≤ c) connection
fingerprints preserves P/c (or P/2k)-PDP, the series of c
counting queries guarantee P-PDP by theorem 1. These two
baseline methods are denoted as Uniform and Exponential,
correspondingly. Both Uniform and Exponential methods are
easy to achieve P-PDP, but they ignore the fact that the
statistics may not change significantly for successive queries
fk due to the sparsity of social network and inherits a large
quantity of unnecessary noises.
Distance-based method. In this paper, we use a distance-
based budget allocation approach inspired by [31] to reduce
noise. Our proposed DEBA starts by distributing the publi-
cation budget in an exponentially decreasing fashion to every
private counting query fk(1 ≤ k ≤ c), i.e., query fk receives
P/2k+1 to publish its counting results. If it is found out that
the distance between the statistics for fk and fk−1(2 ≤ k ≤
c − 1) is smaller than its publication threshold, the counting
query fk is skipped and its corresponding publication budget
becomes available for a future counting query. On the other
hand, if it is decided to publish the counting results of fk , the
fk should absorb all the budgets that became available from
the previous skipped counting queries, and uses it in order to
publish the current counting query fk with higher accuracy.
The presence or absence of one edge in the graph can
contribute to a large number of potential CFPs, i.e., the global
sensitivity of the counting queries is large and so the noise
added to the count has to be scaled up. Our second method,
DUBA-LF, further improves DEBA and uses a new technique,
called ladder functions, for producing differentially private
output. The technique specifies a probability distribution over
possible outputs that are carefully defined to maximize the
utility for the given input, while still providing the required
privacy level. Moreover, we start the DUBA-LF by uniformly
distributing the budget instead of the exponentially distributing
in DEBA.
V. PROPOSED METHODS
We propose a distance-based budget absorption approach
to release the number of kth-hop(1 ≤ k ≤ c) CFPs under
P-PDP. Instead of releasing a P/c (or P/2k)-PDP result for
every k(1 ≤ k ≤ c), the new publication results are computed
if and only if the distance between the counting statistics and
the latest released statistics is larger than a threshold. It is
worth noting that the statistics may not change significantly
for successive queries fk due to the sparsity of social network.
Therefore, this distance-based budget allocation approach can
save some privacy budgets for a future counting query and
reduce the overall error of released statistics.
In this section, our basic method, called DEBA, is presented
at first. The basic method starts by exponentially distributing
the budget to every private counting query fk(1 ≤ k ≤ c),
and the budget absorption is decided by the distance between
the counting statistics and the latest released statistics. We then
introduce our advanced method, DUBA-LF, which uses ladder
function to reduce the noise introduced by the traditional
differentially private mechanism.
A. DEBA
DEBA(Publication with Distance-based Exponential Budget
Absorption) starts with an exponentially decreasing budget for
every private counting query fk(1 ≤ k ≤ c), and then a
privacy-preserving distance calculation mechanism is adopted
to measure the distance between the counting statistics and the
latest released statistics. The decision step uses the distance
to decide whether to publish the private counting results of fk
or not. If the decision is not, the private counting results of
fk are approximated with the last non-null publication and
the budget of fk becomes available for a future counting
query. Otherwise, the private counting query fk absorbs all the
budgets that are available from the previous skipped counting
queries. The overall privacy budget is divided between the
decision and publishing steps which are designed to guarantee
personalized differential privacy as we will analyze later.
Before introducing the proposed DEBA, we give the sen-
sitivity of counting query fk(1 ≤ k ≤ c) at first. Neighbor
graphs of G are all the graphs G′ which differ from G by
at most a single edge. For the counting query f1, it queries
the number of 1st-hop connection fingerprints for each private
user in the sensitive graph, and changing a single edge in
G will result in at most one entry changing in the 1st-hop
connection fingerprints. Hence, ∆(f1) = 1. For the counting
query fk(2 ≤ k ≤ c), changing a single edge in G will
result in at most |Vpub| = mp entries changing in the kth-
hop connection fingerprints, i.e., ∆(fk) = mp for 2 ≤ k ≤ c.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode of DEBA. DEBA
is decomposed into two sub mechanisms: personal private
distance calculation mechanism M1 and personal private
publication mechanism M2. Line 1-5 capture the calculation
of personal private distance between the counting statistics
and the latest released statistics, labeled as mechanism M1.
Line 6-9 carry out the publication step for 1st-hop connection
fingerprints and line 10-21 carry out the publication step for
kth-hop(2 ≤ k ≤ c) connection fingerprints. Line 11 or line
17 gets the total budgets of skipped queries whose budgets
for publication is absorbed. Then the publication threshold Tk
for query fk is determined by mp/k,2. The reason to define
such a threshold is that the injecting Laplace noise of fk is
with scale Tk. Then DEBA compares the distance dist to the
threshold Tk(line 12). If the distance is larger than Tk , DEBA
samples the private social network G(Line 13) and outputs
the noisy counts (Line 14), or null otherwise (Line 20). In
addition, DEBA outputs cth-hop connection fingerprints with
the totally remaining budgets as shown in Line 16-19.
Remark: Recall that the error of randomly sampling input
graph G is data-dependent as well as the error of distance
based approximation. And we cannot present a formal utility
analysis for such a data-dependent mechanism. We will present
extensive experiments using real datasets to justify the perfor-
mance of our algorithms. Moreover, precisely optimizing t for
an arbitrary f may be nontrivial in practice because, although
the error of DP tf may be quantified without knowledge of the
dataset, the impact of sampling does depend on the input data.
A possible option, in some cases, is to make use of old data
that is no longer sensitive (or not as sensitive), and that comes
from a similar distribution, to approximately optimize the
threshold without violating privacy. It is demonstrated that for
many functions, the simple heuristics of setting t = maxv P v
or t = 1m
∑
v P
v , often give good results on real data and
privacy specifications[6].
B. DUBA-LF
The proposed DEBA mechanism publishes the private count
of fk by adding Laplace noise to the true answer, where the
scale of noise is proportional to the global sensitivity of fk.
It is pointed out that the global sensitivity of fk is 1 for
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of DEBA
Input:
G− private input graph
Vpri,G− the set of private users in G
Vpub,G− the set of public users in G
P− the privacy specification
m− the cardinality of Vpri,G
c− the counting range
t− the configurable sample threshold
Output: F˜ = (F˜1,F˜2,......,F˜c);
For each k(1 ≤ k ≤ c) do
//personal private distance calculation mechanism M1
1: Calculate Fk = fk(G).
2: Identify last non-null release F˜r from F˜ .
3: Sample ck = RS(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) with probability
pi(vi, t/2c).
4: Set dist = 1m
∑m
j=1
∣∣∣F˜r[j]− ck[j]∣∣∣ and k,1 = t/2c.
5: Calculate dist = dist+ Lap(2mpc/mt).
//personal private publication mechanism M2
6: if k = 1 then
7: Set k,2 = t/4.
8: Sample Gk = RS(G,P/4, t/4) with probability
pi(eij , t/4).
9: Calculate F˜k = f˜k(G) =fk(Gk) + Lap( 4t ).
10: else if k < c then
11: Calculate k,2 =
∑k
j=r+1
t
2j+1 and Tk = mp/k,2.
12: if dist > Tk, then
13: Sample Gk = RS(G,P ·
∑k
j=r+1
1
2j+1 , k,2) with
probability pi(eij , k,2).
14: Calculate F˜k = f˜k(G) =fk(Gk) + Lap(
mp
k,2
).
15: end if
16: else if k = c then
17: Calculate k,2 =
∑k
j=r+1
t
2j+1 and Tk = mp/k,2.
18: Sample Gk = RS(G,P ·
∑k
j=r+1
1
2j+1 , t/4) with
probability pi(eij , k,2).
19: Calculate F˜k = f˜k(G) =fk(Gk) + Lap(
mp
k,2
).
20: else set F˜k = null.
21: end if
EndFor
k = 1 or mp for 2 ≤ k ≤ c. It is obvious that there can
be numerous public users in large network graphs. Hence, the
global sensitivity of counting query fk may be very large and
makes the noise large enough to overwhelm the true answer.
In order to improve the utility of private release for fk, we use
the new definition of ladder function to reduce the introduced
noise. The definition of ladder function is presented at first.
Definition 10: (Ladder function[26]). A function Ix(G) is
said to be a ladder function of query f if and only if
(a)LS(G, f) ≤ I0(G), for any G;
(b)Ix(G
′) ≤ Ix+1(G), for any pair of neighboring graphs
G,G′, and any nonnegative integer x.
A straightforward example of a ladder function for count
query fk is It(G, fk) = ∆(fk), since LS(G, f) ≤ ∆(fk) for
any G, and a constant always satisfies the second requirement.
However, as aforementioned, the global sensitivity of counting
query fk can be extremely large for CFP counting, which may
not require so much noise.
For counting query f1, its global sensitivity is 1 and the
ladder function for f1 can be defined as It(G, f1) = 1. Before
detailing the ladder function for fk(2 ≤ k ≤ c), the important
notation local sensitivity is refined by defining the sensitivity
for a particular pair of nodes by defining the sensitivity for a
particular pair of nodes (vi, vj), denoted by LSij(G, f). Then
LS(G, f) = maxi,j LSij(G, f). Let pi denotes the number of
the number of 1st-hop connection fingerprints for user vi and
dmax be the maximum node degree in G. Then it is easy to get
that LS(G, fk) = maxi pi for fk(2 ≤ k ≤ c).Without losing
of generality, we simply assume that pi ≤ pj for a particular
pair of nodes (vi, vj). Then we give our ladder function for
kth-hop connection fingerprint counting queries fk(2 ≤ k ≤
c) in Theorem 4 and prove that the constructed ladder function
satisfy the requirements in Definition 10.
Theorem 4: It(G, fk) = min{mp, LS(G, fk)+t}is a ladder
function for fk(2 ≤ k ≤ c).
Proof: The proof contains the following two steps.
(i)LS(G, fk) ≤ I0(G, fk) for any G. This step is trivial since
I0(G, fk) = LS(G, fk).
(ii)It(G
′, fk) ≤ It+1(G, fk) for any neighboring
graphs G′ and G. Note the fact that the set
{G∗|d(G∗, G′) ≤ t} is a subset of {G∗|d(G∗, G) ≤ t + 1}.
Therefore, maxG∗|d(G∗,G′)≤t ‖fk(G′) − fk(G∗)‖ ≤
maxG∗|d(G∗,G)≤t+1 ‖fk(G∗) − fk(G)‖, i.e., It+1(G, fk) =
min{mp, LS(G, fk) + t + 1} = min{mp, LS(G, fk, t +
1)} ≥= min{mp, LS(G′, fk, t)} = It(G′, fk).
It is clear that the ladder function It(G, fk) converges to
∆(fk) when t ≥ ∆(fk) − LS(G, fk). The ladder function
It(G, fk) is used to determine the quality function q in
exponential mechanism and define how q varies. In particular,
q is a symmetric function over the entire integer domain,
centered at fk(G). The quality function q is defined as follows:
Definition 11: (Ladder Quality[26]). Formally, given lad-
der function Ix(G, fk) we define the ladder quality function
qfk(G, vi, s) for node vi by
(i) qfk(G, vi, fk(vi)) = 0;
(ii) for s ∈ fk(vi) ± (
∑u−1
t=0 Ix(G, fk),
∑u
t=0 It(G, fk)], set
qfk(G, vi, s) = −u− 1.
After assigning each integer a quality score, the sensitivity
of the quality function can be calculated as, ∆(qfk) =
maxvi,G,G′ ‖qfk(G, vi, s) − qfk(G′, vi, s)‖ = 1. We refer the
reader to [26](THEOREM 4.2) for a full description of the
proof of it.
DUBA-LF (Publication with Distance-based Uniformly
Budget Absorption using Ladder Function) uses ladder func-
tion to reduce the introduced noise while reallocating the pre-
allocated uniform privacy budget. The pseudocode of DUBA-
LF is presented in Algorithm 2. The personal private distance
calculation mechanism M1 is identical to that of DEBA
(Lines 1-5 in Algorithm 1). The personal private publication
mechanism M2 is presented in Lines 6-21. Lines 6-9 carry out
Algorithm 2 Pseudocode of DUBA-LF
Input:
G− private input graph
Vpri,G− the set of private users in G
Vpub,G− the set of public users in G
P− the privacy specification
m− the cardinality of Vpri,G
c− the counting range
t− the configurable sample threshold
Output: F˜ = (F˜1,F˜2,......,F˜c);
For each k(1 ≤ k ≤ c) do
//personal private distance calculation mechanism M1
//Same as Lines 1-5 in Algorithm 1
//personal private publication mechanism M2
6: if k = 1 then
7: Set k,2 = t/2c.
8: Sample Gk = RS(G,P/2c, t/2c) with probability
pi(eij , t/2c).
9: Calculate F˜k = f˜k(G) =fk(Gk) + Lap( 2ct ).
10: else if k < c then
11: Calculate k,2 = (k − r)t/2c and Tk = mp/k,2.
12: if dist > Tk, then
13: Sample Gk = RS(G,P · (k − r)/c, k,2) with proba-
bility pi(eij , k,2).
14: Calculate F˜k = LFNoising(fk(Gk), k,2, Ix(G, fk)).
15: end if
16: else if k = c then
17: Calculate k,2 = (k − r)t/2c and Tk = mp/k,2.
18: Sample Gk = RS(G,P · (k − r)/c, k,2) with proba-
bility pi(eij , k,2).
19: Calculate F˜k = LFNoising(fk(Gk), k,2, Ix(G, fk)).
20: else set F˜k = null.
21: end if
EndFor
the publication step for counting query f1. The publication step
for kth-hop(2 ≤ k ≤ c) connection fingerprints is carried out
in Line 10-21. DUBA-LF samples the private social network
G(Line 13 or Line 18) in the same way with DEBA but
the sampling probabilities are different. The personal private
publication for kth-hop(2 ≤ k ≤ c) connection fingerprints in
DUBA-LF is also different to DEBA. If the distance is larger
than Tk or counting for fc, DUBA-LF uses an exponential
mechanism based mechanism LFNoising to provide differen-
tial privacy (Line 14 and Line 19). In the meantime, DUBA-LF
outputs null if the distance is not larger than Tk (Line 20).
LFNoising is an extending algorithm of NoiseSample in
[26]. NoiseSample is proposed to output one value as the final
differentially private result while our proposed LFNoising is
aims to solve the problem of differentially private releasing in
the vector form. The pseudocode of LFNoising is presented
in Algorithm 3. Given the ladder function It(G, fk), the
calculation of the range and weight for the first few rungs, e.g.,
Algorithm 3 LFNoising(fk(Gk), k,2, Ix(G, fk))
Input:
fk(Gk)− the number of kth-hop connection fingerprints
in sampled input graph Gk
k,2− the notional publication budget
Ix(G, fk)− the ladder function
Output: F˜k = (F˜k[1],F˜k[2],......,F˜k[m]);
1: Set d = 0, range[0] = fk(Gk) and weight[0] =
exp(
εk,2
2 · 0).
2: for x = 1 to M = mp − LS(G, fk) do
3: range[x] = fk(Gk)± (d, d+ Ix−1(G, fk)]m.
4: weight[x] = 2Ix−1(G, fk)exp(
εk,2
2 · (− x)).
5: d = d+ Ix−1(G, fk).
6: end for
7: weight[M + 1] = 2mpexp(
εk,2
2 ·(−M−1))
1−exp(− εk,22 )
.
8: Randomly sample m integers T = (t1, t2, · · · , tm).
Here ti(1 ≤ i ≤ m)is draw with probability weight[ti]
over sum of weights.
9: for i = 1 to m do
10: if ti ≤ M then uniformly sample an integer j from
range[ti][i] and set F˜k[i] = j;
11: else sample an integer h from the geometric distribu-
tion with parameter p = 1− exp(− εk,22 ).
12: uniformly sample an integer j from fk(Gk)[i] ±
d+ hmp + (0,mp] and set F˜k[i] = j.
13: end if
14: end for
15: return F˜k.
rung 0 (the center) to rung M + 1 (M = mp−LS(G, fk))are
shown in Lines 1-7. Lines 8-12 describe the random sampling
of the private publication vector F˜k which presents the private
count of kth-hop(2 ≤ k ≤ c) connection fingerprints.
VI. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The proofs of privacy guarantees for the proposed mech-
anisms are formally provided in this section. We show the
proposed DEBA satisfies P-personalized differential privacy
first.
Lemma 1: Mechanism M1 in Algorithm 1 is P/2-
personalized differentially private.
Proof: We use the notation Fk,−v and Fk,+v to mean
the graph resulting from removing from or adding to Fk
the tuple fk(v). We can represent two neighboring datasets
(vectors) as Fk and Fk,−v . For each 1 ≤ k ≤ c, all of the
possible outputs of RS(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) can be divided into
those in which fk(v) was selected, and those in which fk(v)
was not selected. The sensitivity of dist function in M1 is
mp/m, therefore, the mechanism injects Laplace noise with
scale 2mpc/mt in Line 5 can be denoted as DP
t/2c
dist .Thus,
we have
Pr[Sfk(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) ∈ O]
= Pr[DP
t/2c
dist (RS(Fk,P/2c, t/2c)) ∈ O]
=
∑
Z∈Fk,−v
(pi(v, t/2c)Pr[RS(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) = Z]·
Pr[DP
t/2c
dist (Z+v) ∈ O]) +
∑
Z∈Fk,−v
((1− pi(v, t/2c))·
Pr[RS(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) = Z]Pr[DP t/2cdist (Z) ∈ O])
≤
∑
Z∈Fk,−v
(pi(v, t/2c)Pr[RS(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) = Z]et/2c·
Pr[DP
t/2c
dist (Z) ∈ O])+
(1− pi(v, t/2c))Sfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
≤ et/2cpi(v, t/2c)Sfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)+
(1− pi(v, t/2c))Sfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
= (1− pi(v, t/2c) + et/2cpi(v, t/2c))Sfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
(1)
There are two cases for v that we must consider:
(1)P v/2c ≥ t/2c; (2)P v/2c < t/2c. For the former
case, we have pi(v, t/2c) = 1 and eq.(1) can be rewritten as
Pr[Sfk(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) ∈ O]
≤ (1− 1 + et/2c · 1)Sfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
= et/2cSfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
≤ ePv/2cSfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
For the latter case P v/2c < t/2c,
Pr[Sfk(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) ∈ O]
≤ (1− pi(v, t/2c) + et/2cpi(v, t/2c))Sfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
= (1− e
Pv/2c − 1
et/2c − 1 +e
t/2c e
Pv/2c − 1
et/2c − 1 )Sfk(Fk,−v, P/2c, t/2c)
=
eP
v/2c(et/2c − 1)
et/2c − 1 Sfk(Fk,−v, P/2c, t/2c)
= eP
v/2cSfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c)
To sum up, we have Pr[Sfk(Fk,P/2c, t/2c) ∈ O] ≤
eP
v/2cSfk(Fk,−v,P/2c, t/2c), and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ c, the
mechanism satisfies P/2c-PDP. Therefore, according to The-
orem 2, mechanism M1 in Algorithm 1 is P/2-personalized
differentially private.
We have proved that mechanism M1 satisfies P/2-
personalized differential privacy. To prove that DEBA satisfies
P-personalized differential privacy, we must prove that, for
every k(1 ≤ k ≤ c), M2 is P ·
∑k
j=r+1
t
2j+1 - personalized
differentially private if it publishes, and 0 - personalized
differentially private otherwise.
Theorem 5: The proposed DEBA satisfies P-PDP.
Proof: Mechanism M1 satisfying P/2-personalized dif-
ferential privacy is captured in Lemma 1. Mechanism M2
publishes F˜k or null. In the latter case, the privacy budget
is trivially equal to zero, as no publication occurs. In the
former case, the sensitivity of fk is mp for 2 ≤ k ≤ c and
1 for k = 1 and the publication budget depends on previous
publications. Hence, the mechanism injects Laplace noise with
scale mp∑k
j=r+1
t
2j+1
can be denoted as DP
∑k
j=r+1
t
2j+1
fk
for
2 ≤ k ≤ c and the mechanism injects Laplace noise with
scale 4/t can be denoted as DP t/4f1 for k = 1.Following the
proof technology in Lemma 1, it is easy to prove that M2 is
P ·∑kj=r+1 t2j+1 -PDP if it publishes a non-null result for each
k(1 ≤ k ≤ c). Moreover, the total publication budget is P/2,
and it at most equals to the case where each of these c queries
receives a budget of t
2k+1
. So,
c∑
j=1
1
2j+1P ≤ P2 . According to
Theorem 2, we get the conclusion that M2 satisfies P/2-PDP.
To sum up, the proposed DEBA satisfies P-PDP.
DUBA-LF employs a personal private distance calculation
mechanism M1 identical to that of DEBA and its privacy
guarantee is captured by Lemma 1. In order to show the mech-
anism M2 in DUBA-LF satisfies P/2-PDP, we need to prove
that the algorithm LFNoising(fk(Gk), k,2, It(G, fk)) is k,2-
differentially private, i.e., LFNoising(fk(Gk), k,2, It(G, fk))
can be denoted as DP εk,2fk .
Lemma 2: LFNoising(fk(Gk), k,2, It(G, fk)) is k,2- dif-
ferentially private.
Proof: There are two steps in the algorithm LFNoising:
selecting a rung of the ladder (where rung M+1 is considered
as a special case) according to the relative value of the weight
of the rung and picking an integer from the corresponding
rung. For rungs 0 to M , the possible output values on the
same rungs are picked uniformly. For rung M+1, the possible
outputs are determined by two actions picking how many
further rungs down the ladder to go and then picking uniformly
from these. As discussed above, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the output
probability distribution is equal to
Pr[F˜k[i] =ρ] =
exp (
εk,2
2∆(qfk)
·qfk (G,vi,ρ))∑
ρ∈
exp (
εk,2
2∆(qfk)
·qfk (G,vi,ρ))
As argued above, if the input graph G is replaced by its neigh-
boring graph G, the quality of ρ will be changed by at most
∆ (qfk) = 1, i.e., the numerator exp (
εk,2
2∆(qfk)
· qfk(G, vi,ρ))
can change at most exp ( εk,2
2∆(qfk)
· ∆ (qfk) ) = exp ( εk,22 ).
Moreover, a single change in graph G the changing in denomi-
nator is minimized by a factor of exp (− εk,22 ), giving the ratio
of the new probability of ρ and the original one exp (εk,2).
Therefore,LFNoising(fk(Gk), k,2, It(G, fk)) is k,2- differen-
tially private.
This result highlights the fact that LFNois-
ing(fk(Gk), k,2, It(G, fk)) can be denoted as DP
εk,2
fk
.
Similar to Theorem 5, we can conclude that DUBA-LF is
P-personalized differentially private.
Theorem 6: The proposed DUBA-LF satisfies P-PDP.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5 and we
omit it.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We make use of three real-world graph datasets in our
experiments: polblogs[32], facebook[33] and CondMat[34]
TABLE I
DATASETS PROPERTIES
Dataset nodes edges diameter density |Vpub|
Polblogs 1222 16724 8 2.24% 61
Facebook 4039 88234 8 1.08% 201
CondMat 23133 93439 14 0.0349% 1156
networks. The polblogs network was crawled from the US
political blogosphere in 2005. The vertices are blogs of a set
of US politicians, and an edge between two blogs represents
the existence of hyperlinks from one blog to the other. The
facebook network was collected from the survey participants
using a Facebook app. The vertices are Facebook users, and
an edge between two users represents the established friend-
ship between them. The CondMat network was collaboration
networks from the e-print arXiv, which cover scientific collab-
orations between authors who submitted papers to Condensed
Matter category. The edge between two authors represents an
author co-authored a paper with another author in this network.
All the networks are represented by undirected and unweighted
graphs with no isolated vertices.
The real-world networks we used do not contain public
user identity. In other words, all vertices in the networks are
anonymous. In order to evaluate the proposed CFPs publi-
cation algorithms, we select a set of vertices in each network
assuming their identities are public. Thereafter, based on these
public vertices, we generate the CFPs of the remaining private
vertices. In this paper, we select vertices with the highest
degrees as public vertices and the proportion of public users
is set to 5% in our whole experiment. Table I presents some
basic statistics of the networks.
We compared DEBA and DUBA-LF with benchmarks
Uniform and Exponential over these three datasets. We im-
plemented all methods in Matlab, ran each experiment 100
times, and reported the average error, expressed as the Mean
Absolute Error (MAE) and the Mean Relative Error (MRE).
To generate the privacy specifications for our experiments,
we randomly divided the private users (records) into three
groups: conservative, representing users with high privacy
concern; moderate, representing users with medium concern;
and liberal, representing users with low concern. The fraction
of each type users is 1/3. The privacy preferences for the users
in the conservative, moderate and liberal groups received a
privacy preference of c = 1, m = 4 and l = 16 respectively.
As a result, the average privacy preference of all users equals
to 7.
Fig.1 plots the MAE and MRE of all schemes for the
Polblogs dataset, where we vary the sampling threshold t and
set c = 4. DUBA-LF is the best method in this setting. And
it outperforms Uniform mechanism by up to 76.6% in MAE
and 152.5% in MRE, Exponential by up to 50.3% in in MAE
and 98.4% in MRE, and DEBA by up to 5.0% in MAE and
10.4% in MRE. The results also indicate that increasing the
sampling threshold has an effect of decreasing of MAR and
Fig. 1. MAE and MRE of each mechanism for the Polblogs dataset, as sample
threshold is varied and c is set to 4.
MRE for DUBA-LF, DEBA and Uniform mechanisms but the
effect for Exponential mechanism is not evident.
Fig. 2. MAE and MRE of each mechanism for the Polblogs dataset, as sample
threshold is varied and c is set to 7.
Fig.2 plots the MAE and MRE of all schemes for the
Polblogs dataset, where we vary the sampling threshold t and
set c = 7. DUBA-LF is the best method in the measurement
of MRE but is outperformed by DEBA in MAE for small
sampling threshold. For the sampling threshold t(t ≥ 4),
DUBA-LF outperforms Uniform mechanism by up to 43.9% in
MAE and 180.4% in MRE, Exponential by up to 38.8% in in
MAE and 181.8% in MRE, and DEBA by up to 7.1% in MAE
and 37.8% in MRE. The increasing the sample threshold has
an effect of decreasing of MAR and MRE for DUBA-LF and
DEBA mechanisms but the effect for Uniform and Exponential
mechanism is less.
Fig.3 shows the MAE and MRE of all schemes for the
Facebook dataset, where we vary the sampling threshold t
and set c = 4. DEBA seems to outperform the other methods
in this setting. And DEBA outperforms Uniform mechanism
by up to 45.8% in MAE and 126.3% in MRE, Exponential
by up to 42.9% in in MAE and 125.0% in MRE, and DUBA-
LF by up to 25.4% in MAE and 76.7% in MRE. Similar to
Fig.2, increasing the sampling threshold has a less evident
effect for both Uniform and Exponential mechanisms. We can
also conclude that increasing the sampling thresholds causes
decreasing of MAR and MRE for DUBA-LF and DEBA for
small threshold t while increasing of MAR and MRE for larger
t.
Fig. 3. MAE and MRE of each mechanism for the Facebook dataset, as
sample threshold is varied and c is set to 4.
Fig. 4. MAE and MRE of each mechanism for the Facebook dataset, as
sample threshold is varied and c is set to 7.
The MAE and MRE of all schemes for the Facebook dataset
is showed in Fig.4, and here we set c = 4 and vary the
sampling threshold t. DUBA-LF seems to outperform the other
methods in this setting. It outperforms Uniform mechanism by
up to 27.2% in MAE and 86.3% in MRE, Exponential by up
to 17.7% in in MAE and 70.0% in MRE, and DEBA by up to
4.1% in MAE and 3.9% in MRE. Similar to Fig.1, increasing
the sampling thresholds causes decreasing of MAR and MRE
for DUBA-LF and DEBA. However, increasing the sample
threshold has an evident effect for decreasing of MAR and
MRE for both Uniform and Exponential for small threshold t
while increasing of MAR and MRE for larger t.
Fig. 5. MAE and MRE of each mechanism for the CondMat dataset, as
sample threshold is varied and c is set to 4.
Fig.5 plots the MAE and MRE of all schemes for the
CondMat dataset, where the sample threshold t is varied and
c is set to 4. DUBA-LF is the best method in this setting.
And it outperforms Uniform mechanism by up to 107.9% in
MAE and one order of magnitude in MRE, Exponential by
up to 107.2% in in MAE and also one order of magnitude
in MRE, and DEBA by up to 35.8% in MAE and 190.7% in
MRE. The results also indicate that increasing the sampling
threshold has an effect of decreasing of MAR and MRE for
DUBA-LF, DEBA and Uniform mechanisms but the effect for
Exponential mechanism is not evident.
Fig. 6. MAE and MRE of each mechanism for the CondMat dataset, as
sample threshold is varied and c is set to 7.
Fig.6 shows the MAE and MRE of all schemes for the
CondMat dataset, where the sample threshold t is varied and
c is set to 7. DUBA-LF is shown to be the best method in
this setting. And it outperforms Uniform mechanism by up
to 120.5% in MAE and 894.5% in MRE, Exponential by up
to 76.9% in in MAE and 862.7% in MRE, and DEBA by
up to 34.4% in MAE and 84.3% in MRE. It is indicated
that increasing the sampling threshold has a little effect of
decreasing of MAR and MRE for Uniform and Exponential
mechanisms. We can also conclude that increasing the sam-
pling thresholds causes decreasing of MAR and MRE for
DUBA-LF and DEBA for small threshold t while increasing
of MAR and MRE for larger t.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The number of CFPs is one of the most important properties
for a public users labeled graph. In order to release the number
of CFPs in the context of personalized privacy preferences,
we proposed two schemes (DEBA and DUBA-LF) to achieve
personal differential privacy. Both DEBA and DUBA-LF use
the distance-based budget absorption mechanism to improve
the publication utility while DUBA-LF also employs ladder
function to reduce the introduced noise. We formally prove
that the proposed DEBA and DUBA-LF schemes are P-PDP
and we conduct thorough experimentation with real datasets,
which demonstrated the superiority and the practicality of our
proposed schemes.
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